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A B S T R A C T
Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is
privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innova-
tion, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on elderly care
services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009 and estimate how opening to private provision affected mor-
tality rates – an important and not easily contractible quality dimension – using a difference-in-difference-
in-difference approach. The results indicate that privatization and the associated increase in competition
signiﬁcantly improved non-contractible quality as measured by mortality rates.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Governments around the world increasingly rely on private con-
tractors for the provision of goods and services.1 One factor behind
this trend is tighter budget constraints, and the hope of enjoying
cost savings from the stronger incentives linked to private owner-
ship and competition. However, precisely because of these stronger
incentives, maintaining an appropriate quality level after opening
to private providers may be a concern. For quality dimensions that
can be veriﬁed at reasonable cost, degradation can be avoided by
properly written and managed contracts. The risk of degradation
is much higher for quality dimensions that are hard to verify, and
hence not easily contractible. However, it is diﬃcult to study the
latter effect empirically: quality dimensions that are not contract-
ible because they cannot be veriﬁed by third parties, i.e., courts, are
also hard to measure for researchers.
In this paper we estimate the effect of opening to private pro-
vision a common service with important quality dimensions that
are hard to contract upon: nursing-home care for the elderly.2 As
an outcome measure of quality we consider mortality rates, a per-
formance indicator commonly used in the healthcare literature.
Mortality was not included as an outcome measure in any of the
several hundred contracts we have observed, most likely because
it is too noisy at the contract level and to avoid inducing screen-
ing of residents. By studying the effects onmortality at the aggregate
level we overcome the noise problem present at the contract level.
By making the municipality the unit of analysis, rather than the in-
dividual home, we can also address the obvious selection effects that
would otherwise risk biasing our results.
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We focus on non-contractible quality because it is crucial for
many important goods and services and because we know little
about it compared to quality in measurable and contractible
dimensions.3 Contractible quality can be more easily controlled by
the buyer, so that stronger incentives should align quality more
closely with the buyer’s preferences. Non-contractible quality is
harder to control for the buyer, and is affected by a number of in-
teracting forces that make its reaction to the opening to private
provision an inherently empirical question.
Opening to private provision may cause unwanted quality deg-
radation in non-contractible dimensions because of the stronger cost-
cutting incentives of private contractors. However, their stronger
investment incentives may compensate, generating innovation that
lead to the opposite outcome.4 Opening to private provision also in-
troduces competition, which we know can have negative effects on
non-contractible quality dimensions.5 But competitionmay also stim-
ulate innovation and improve providers’ management practices,
which may increase non-contractible quality, in particular if price
is regulated.6 Also, as long as buyers have some discretion, they can
react to non-veriﬁable quality signals, reputation, brand names, and
long-term informal relations. This links future sales to current per-
formance and may strengthen sellers’ incentives to maintain high
quality.7
Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of all Swedish mu-
nicipalities over a period of up to 20 years. In this period about
one third of all municipalities privatized – wholly or partially –
the provision of elderly care services. We use data on mortality
by age group (60 to 64, 65 to 69, 70 to 74 and so forth, with the
oldest age group covering those aged 95 and over) and municipal-
ity characteristics (population density, educational level, share of
immigrants in the population aged 65 and above) covering the
period 1990 to 2009. For the latter half of the period we have
access to municipal-level data on the average cost per person in
sheltered permanent accommodation (nursing homes), total ex-
penditures for nursing homes and, by age group, the number of
residents. We then surveyed the municipalities to establish whether
elderly-care services were exclusively produced in-house, or if
provision from private providers had been used at all during the
two most recent decades and if so, during what periods. The
survey was undertaken in 2009 and we obtained answers from all
but six of the 290 municipalities.
The focus on the municipality level, rather than on the con-
tract or nursing-home level, allows us to estimate the joint effect
on mortality of opening to private provision and introducing com-
petition. That is, our estimates capture the overall effect of the
privatization process – the combined effect of both competition, ef-
fective or potential, and private service provision – inmuch the same
way as studies of educational markets that are opened up to entry
by private schools. Our identiﬁcation strategy makes use of the
within-municipality variation in policy. However, as the decision
to procure is a choice by the municipality, we need to acknowl-
edge this in the analysis. To this end, we deploy difference-in-
differences-in-differences (DDD) strategies. We compare the changes
in mortality for municipalities that opened to private provision with
corresponding changes for those that did not. To take into account
possible differences in mortality trends among municipalities, and
the fact that privatization is a choice of themunicipality, we compare
changes in mortality within the population aged 70 and above with
changes in mortality among those aged 60–69 years in the same
municipality.
We ﬁnd that mortality falls (by 1.6%) in the age groups affected
by the introduction of private provision. The results correspond to
an extension, by about four weeks, of the expected remaining two
years of life upon admission to a nursing home. Privatization of
elderly care services is also associated with a 1.7% reduction of
the per-resident cost of service, but there is no reduction of total
cost, suggesting that there is a balancing expansion in the number
of beds.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the theoretical background and prior empirical research.
Section 3 describes the characteristics of the elderly care industry
in Sweden. Section 4 presents our data and reports some descrip-
tive statistics. Section 5 describes our empirical approach. Section
6 presents our main results and Section 7 brieﬂy concludes.
2. Theory and prior empirical studies
In this session, we ﬁrst brieﬂy review the theoretical litera-
tures to which our study is related, then we discuss the closest
previous empirical studies.
Contractual incentives. Opening to private provision introduces
stronger incentives, both because of the characteristics of
private providers and because of the introduction of competition.
Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) classic study made clear that
when non-contractible tasks are valuable, stronger incentives
may backﬁre because they increase focus on observable, measur-
able tasks, crowding out effort on non-contractible ones. This
argument ‘per se’ would predict lower non-contractible quality
after privatization.
Hart et al. (1997) study a richer model focusing precisely on
how the mode of public-goods production – in-house or by private
suppliers – affects non-contractible quality provision besides in-
novation and cost eﬃciency, and achieve somewhat different results
(see also Shleifer, 1998). They propose an incomplete-contractsmodel
where a provider can make non-veriﬁable investments to in-
crease (non-veriﬁable) quality or to reduce cost; the latter investment
will, however, be associated with a fall in quality. An external sup-
plier will be more prone to making both types of investments, but
may tend to focus too much on cost savings, at the expense of
quality. If non-contractible cost reductions have large deleterious
effects on non-contractible quality and there is little scope for
eﬃciency-enhancing innovation, then in-house government pro-
duction may be preferred. Otherwise, provision by private suppliers
should be preferred as it may lead to increased quality as well as
lower costs.
Informal Relationships and Reputation. In standard market inter-
actions, suppliers’ incentives to degrade quality are also checked by
the risk of losing future business. With repeat purchases, buyers may
establish long-term supply relations, supported by threats to break
those relations if the suppliers degrade quality (MacLeod, 2007;
Malcomson, 2012). Absent repeat purchases, concerns over repu-
tation, and brand-name value can still sustain quality provision
(Bar-Isaac and Tadelis, 2008; Klein and Leﬄer, 1981). In the context
of public procurement, however, these governance mechanisms are
limited by accountability concerns (Kelman, 1990).83 Many previous studies on procurement, outsourcing and privatization seek to
estimate cost savings, while also controlling for changes in contractible quality
dimensions.
4 Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997.
5 Spulber, 1990; Manelli and Vincent, 1995.
6 Bloom et al., 2010, Spence, 1975.
7 See, e.g., MacLeod, 2007; Klein and Leﬄer, 1981. However, for accountability
reasons public procurement regulation typically limits buyer discretion and with
it the scope for such informal governance mechanisms (Kelman, 1990).
8 Although a public contracting authority may commit to such schemes (Calzolari
and Spagnolo, 2009; Iossa and Rey, 2014), it may not be possible or desirable to give
it the necessary discretion due to the risk of corruption (Banﬁeld, 1975). Indeed, in
many countries a contracting authority is, in principle, not allowed to discriminate
in favor of strong brand names or providers that performed well in the past on non-
110 M.A. Bergman et al. / Journal of Health Economics 49 (2016) 109–119
Competition. In the absence of consumer choice and with
reputational forces constrained by accountability regulation, if low
non-contractible quality is associated with low costs, competition
on price will tend to reduce quality (e.g. Spulber, 1990; Manelli and
Vincent, 1995). Also, to the extent that intense price competition
makes future sales less proﬁtable, the prospect of future sales will
be a weaker incentive to provide quality today (Stiglitz, 1989).
However, Spence (1975) showed that price regulation could revert
this negative effect of competition on quality. In line with this ar-
gument, Gaynor and Town (2011) present a model of a health-
care market where quality increases with competition if prices are
ﬁxed, but where the effect is indeterminate if prices are set by the
market. Competition may also improve managerial incentives and
management practices, and through them the quality offered by the
provider (Bloom et al., 2010). With competition may come an
element of consumer choice that could sustain quality, again by
linking future sales to current performance.9 And, in sectors like
elderly care, where agents are often intrinsically motivated (“mission
oriented”), an increase in competition may improve overall perfor-
mance through an increase in the heterogeneity of the services
provided and an improved matching of employers’ and employ-
ees’ missions (Besley and Gathak, 2005).
Given the existence of sound theoretical arguments pointing in
different directions, the relation between privatization and non-
contractible quality is likely to be sensitive to the speciﬁcs of the
market, which makes it an intrinsically empirical question.
2.1. Prior empirical research
While there is an extensive empirical literature on the effects of
privatization on prices, access and contractible quality, relatively few
studies have touched on the effects of privatization on hard-to con-
tract quality dimensions. As already mentioned, an obvious
explanation is the diﬃculty of subjecting a quality dimension that
is hard to verify to measurement and quantitative analysis by
researchers.
One topic that has, however, generated a relatively large empir-
ical literature is the effect of school voucher programs on pupil
performance (e.g. Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006, and Angrist et al., 2006)
and choice of school (Angrist et al., 2002).10 Here private provision
goes hand-in-hand with intensiﬁed competition through consum-
er choice based on voucher systems; a typical ﬁnding seems to be
that there is no signiﬁcant effect on average pupil performance
(MacLeod and Urquiola, 2013).
Some studies have focused on prison services.11 Among these
Bédard and Frech (2009) ﬁnd that a 13% increase in contracted
medical staff increasedmortality by 1.3%. While they study the same
outcome as we do, they do not have information on costs. They
cannot, therefore, evaluate whether the reduction in quality, as mea-
sured by the increased mortality, was accompanied by strong cost
savings.
Quantitative studies of quality in the US nursing-home indus-
try have mainly focused on the difference between non-proﬁt and
for-proﬁt facilities. Anderson et al. (2003), for example, report lower
quality in for-proﬁt care. Similarly, Amirkhanyan et al. (2008) ﬁnd
that for-proﬁt providers violate quality standards more often than
non-proﬁt providers; and Chou (2002) ﬁnds that for-proﬁt homes
provide lower quality than non-proﬁt rivals when the resident’s po-
sition is weak (i.e., when the client has no living close relatives or
has dementia), but not otherwise. In commonwith the current study,
Chou uses mortality as the main indicator of quality.
A concern with all of these studies is that the estimated effect
of the owners’ objectives on quality may be affected by sample-
selection bias. To address this concern, Grabowski and Stevenson
(2008) focus on changes in quality following changes in owner ob-
jectives among US nursing homes. They ﬁnd that transition from
one category to another does not affect quality, and also that homes
that change from for-proﬁt to non-proﬁt status tend to provide higher
quality than homes that make the opposite transition. They con-
clude that the negative impact of for-proﬁt status found in earlier
studies is due to selection effects, rather than a causal effect of own-
ership status.
The effect of competition on quality in hospital care has at-
tracted a substantial amount of research during the last decade, as
surveyed by Gaynor and Town (2011). Many of these studies focus
on markets with regulated prices and ﬁnd that the quality of care
– oftenmeasured by (inverse) mortality – increases signiﬁcantly with
hospital competition and/or decreases with hospital concentra-
tion (e.g. Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Gowrisankaran and Town,
2003; and Kessler and Geppert, 2005 for the US; Cooper et al., 2011;
and Gaynor et al., 2013, for the UK). It is worth noting that an earlier
study by Propper et al. (2008) studied a UK policy reform that in-
troduced competition between 1991 and 1997, but with negotiated
rather than ﬁxed prices. The ﬁndings suggest that during this period,
competition reduced quality in some dimensions that were not
monitored.
Broadening the perspective to other markets, there exists a small,
but growing empirical literature comparing the performance of in-
house and outsourcedwater utilities where, arguably, quality is more
easily measurable. Ménard and Saussier (2000) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
differences between in-house and outsourced water utilities, while
Galiani et al. (2005) ﬁnd that child mortality related to water quality
fell signiﬁcantly in Argentina in areas where water services were
privatized. On the contrary, Borraz et al. (2011) ﬁnd that in Uruguay
it was the nationalization of water services that led to an improve-
ment in sanitation rates, water quality and child mortality.
3. Our survey and the Swedish market for provision of
nursing home for the elderly
The key data in this paper originate from a survey performed
by us and it was undertaken in 2009. We surveyed all municipali-
ties on what method they use to organize elderly care services: in-
house production, traditional competitive procurement, voucher
scheme, or a combination thereof. In a questionnaire12 sent to the
municipalities we asked what fraction of the beds was under in-
house operation in 2008, andwhen procurementwas ﬁrst introduced
for this service in the municipality. We also asked if there had been
any changes to the mode of provision of nursing-home care for the
elderly, other than the initial decision to procure from private pro-
viders. Due to the small number of voucher systems operational
during the period we study, we do not distinguish between the two
modes of private provision.
veriﬁable performance dimensions (see e.g. Dellarocas et al., 2006; and Spagnolo,
2012).
9 See the literature on school vouchers, following Friedman (1955), and the lit-
erature on quasi markets, triggered by reforms of the British welfare systems around
1990; e.g., Le Grand (1991).
10 While educational outcomes are partially observable through test results and
grades, contracts are rarely conditioned on outcomes, except possibly the fraction
passing a minimum standard. One reason is that explicit contracting based on out-
comes is likely to distort efforts, e.g., ‘teaching-to-the-test’.
11 Possibly inspired by the lively UK debate and following the inﬂuential paper by
Hart et al. (1997) cited above, which used prisons as an archetypical example.
12 The questionnaire was sent to the head of the elderly care in the municipality
and we reminded the respondents by mail once. This was followed with phone
calls. We tried to reach the person in charge during approximately four weeks. The
questionnaire is found online at http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of
-health-economics.
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In total, 276 out of 290 municipalities are included in the data.
Eight municipalities are excluded from the panel due to them being
involved in a municipality split or merger, and six municipalities
did not respond to our survey. At the time of our survey, 190 mu-
nicipalities report neither having shifted nor having an intention
to shift to private provision, i.e., they rely exclusively on in-house
production during the entire time period studied. One municipal-
ity had already introduced private provision in 1990. Consequently,
85 municipalities reported that, at some point between 1990 and
2009, they shifted from in-house production to procurement and
potentially an external provider. As noted, a tendering process does
not guarantee that a private provider actually enters, although this
is by far the most frequent outcome.13 Note that even if no private
provider enters the market there may be an effect on quality as the
in house provider may increase its quality in response to potential
competition.
Elderly care in Sweden is the responsibility of local govern-
ments at the municipal level. Close to 100,000 persons live
permanently in nursing homes for the elderly, while more than
150,000 receive assisted living services at home. The provision of
elderly care is an important part of the welfare system and it con-
sumes a relatively large part of the Swedish public sector’s resources.
The cost of elderly care services – assisted living as well as care in
nursing homes – was approximately SEK90 billion in 2008, or close
to 3% of GDP. Of this, SEK 56 billion was for elderly care units.14
There are roughly 2600 nursing homes in Sweden, of which about
10% were privately operated in 2008.15 Almost all of the supplying
ﬁrms are owned by for-proﬁt corporations; many of the owners are
private equity ﬁrms. However, admittance decisions are made by
the municipality.
In 2009, the elderly living at nursing homes constituted 6% of
Sweden’s senior citizens (i.e. the population aged 65 or more). This
is less than in the Netherlands and Switzerland, about the same as
in Norway and more than in UK/England, where the rate is about
5%. In the US, Germany and France, about 4% of the elderly popu-
lation live in institutions. Between the 1990s and 2009, Sweden saw
a sharp decrease in the rate of institutional care of elderly, while
most other rich countries saw stable or increasing levels (Rodrigues
et al., 2012). Senior citizens aged 80 or above make up 80% of the
residents; in this age group, 16% of the population lives perma-
nently in nursing homes. The fraction rises to about 50% for seniors
above 95 years of age. More than two thirds of the residents are
women and around three quarters of the residents have dementia.16
Variation within Sweden is high; the ratio between the munic-
ipality with the highest and the lowest proportion of its senior
citizens in nursing homes is about 4:1. Northern and rural munici-
palities tend to have a higher proportion of their population in
nursing homes, mainly due to an older overall population. Larsson
et al. (2008) report that, among those aged 80 or more, the pro-
portion living in nursing homes fell by about a quarter between 1995
and 2004, due to better health and to a policy shift toward provid-
ing more assistance at home in order to delay entry into nursing
homes.
Admittance to a nursing home is a strong indicator of in-
creasedmortality risk. Based on a survey conducted in 1995, Larsson
et al. (2008) report that while about 10% of the population aged 75
or more are living in elderly care units ﬁve years before their death,
this rises to about 50% in the months prior to death.17 Based on the
same survey, they ﬁnd that the average age when admitted to a
nursing home is about 84 years. After about one year in a home,
half of the individuals will have deceased.18
Procurement from private suppliers has become an important
mechanism for organizing the provision of elderly care services in
Sweden since the 1990s. Nursing-home service-provision con-
tracts are awarded after a tendering procedure where the winner
is nominated on the basis of lowest price, highest score for price
and quality or for the time period studied, more unusually, highest
quality for a given price. Once a winner has been nominated, the
contract is essentially a per-resident ﬁxed-fee contract with an
average duration of close to four years. The procurer normally has
an option to extend the contract once or twice, with an average total
extension period of almost four years.19 A private supplier cannot
decide whom to accept, and nor does it have the right to decline if
it has capacity (open spots), while the capacity is deﬁned in the con-
tract. Income-dependent fees cover on average 4% of the cost, with
the municipalities paying the rest. Even when a nursing home is
privately operated, the facility itself is usually owned by the
municipality.
According to EU procurement regulation, any qualitative crite-
ria that will be considered when public contracts are allocated must
be veriﬁable and listed in the so-called contract notice (a docu-
ment published by the contracting authority that contains the
information on which potential suppliers base their bids). Con-
tract performance clauses are also to be speciﬁed in the same
document, while past performance information cannot be used for
the selection of contractors. These rules limit considerably the pos-
sibility that quality is sustained by “the shadow of the future”
(Spagnolo, 2012). However, prior to the Swedish 2008 Procure-
ment Act, the Swedish legislation allowed a rather liberal
interpretation, in the sense that the buyer had a relatively high degree
of freedom to select the winner (Hyytinen et al., 2008).
The legislation allows the municipality’s own production unit
to participate in the tendering process on an equal footing with
private providers, although the municipality may, of course, choose
not to do so. Legislation that formally allows the organization of a
voucher system was introduced in 2009, although a handful of mu-
nicipalities had such systems in place earlier, possibly in violation
of the rules.20
4. The data
Our key measure of (inverse) quality is the mortality rate. Mor-
tality data across ﬁve-year age groups as well as municipality
characteristics – i.e., population, population density, educational level
(more than three years of university-level education), political pref-
erences (distribution of seats on the local council) and share of
population of immigrants aged 65 and over – were obtained from
Statistics Sweden (SCB) for the period 1990 to 2009. Municipal-
level data on the average cost per resident in nursing homes for the
elderly and total expenditures for nursing homes for the period 2000
to 2009, and the number of residents for the period 1990 to 2009,
were obtained from the National Board of Health and Welfare
(NBHW).
13 According to a more recent sample, the municipalities that own production units
win about 10% of the tendered contracts; see Bergman et al. (2014).
14 NBHW (2009).
15 NBHW (2008). In addition, there are about 150 transitory (short-stay) nursing
homes, with another 11,000 residents. The fraction of private provision has risen
rapidly since, to more than 20% in 2012.
16 SALAR (2007); NBHW (2009).
17 The survey was conducted in 1995 on 567 elderly persons living in Stockholm.
The individuals were followed until 2005.
18 Personal communication with experts at SALAR.
19 Bergman et al. (2014).
20 Four municipalities introduced user choice in the early 2000s, one more
followed in 2006 and another two in 2008–2009.
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4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics of socio-economic factors
that will be controlled for in the empirical analysis. For simplicity,
means are provided for three years: 1990, 2000 and 2009. Addi-
tional summary statistics are presented for 2009. All ﬁgures are
reported for the full sample but also by type of provision: pure in-
house or open to private provision.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the total cost for nursing-
home care, the cost per resident living in a nursing home, the share
of the population aged 65 or more that live in nursing homes, and
the share of beds procured in municipalities that have privatized.
From Table 1 we can clearly see that opening up to private pro-
vision is more prevalent in the more urban areas of Sweden.
Municipalities that privatize tend to have a larger population and
be more densely populated than those that have never procured.
They have a more highly educated population and political pref-
erences associated with fewer left-of-center seats in the local
government (t-values for mean differences are provided in the table).
According to the values presented in Table 2, there are no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant differences when it comes to the share of
immigrants aged 65 and more in the population, average cost per
resident, or the share of senior citizens living in nursing homes. The
data on the share of senior citizens living in nursing homes are avail-
able for ﬁve-year age groups. The average annual cost per person
is close to SEK 540,000 or, approximately, €60,000 (at the 2009 price
level).
As seen in Table 2, there is a notable dispersion in the extent of
privately provided care within the group that does procure at some
point between 1990 and 2009, and the share of procurement clearly
increased between 2000 and 2009. Furthermore, although not re-
ported in the table, while in 2000 the highest share of procurement
was 66%, we observe two municipalities with 100% external pro-
vision in 2009.
Fig. 1 shows the development of annual mortality rates for two
age intervals: 60–69, and 70 and above.21 Generally, there was a sig-
niﬁcant fall in mortality rates between 1990 and 2009 due to
improved health in the population. Also, for all age groups, mor-
tality rates tend to be markedly higher in municipalities that only
have in-house production than in municipalities that privatized.
Given the generally favorable socio-economic situation of munici-
palities that have allowed private providers, this is to be expected
(i.e., a selection effect). Still, part of the difference may be a result
of privatization (i.e., a causal effect). In the graphs, a municipality
that begins procurement sometime between 1990 and 2009 is cat-
egorized as privatization in all years.
21 Corresponding diagrams for 5-year age groups are shown in Bergman et al. (2012).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics, municipality characteristics, 1990–2009, for all municipalities, for municipalities that partially privatize provision and for those that maintain pure
in-house production. Source: Statistics Sweden.
Variable/Year Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. # Obs |t-test|
1990 2000 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009
Population (inhabitants) 29,211.82 29,898.24 31,389.26 63,963.99 2,500 829,417 276
Privatization 54,175.22 57,836.85 62,552.85 106,212.20 7,156 829,417 86 3.93
Pure in-house 17,792.40 17,252.34 17,283.64 15,416.58 2,500 95,798 190
Population density (pop./km2) 124.98 127.54 139.10 475.52 0.20 4,410.40 276
Privatization 288.30 313.34 345.71 803.64 0.90 4,410.40 86 3.45
Pure in-house 50.27 43.44 45.57 101.70 0.20 876.30 190
Share immigrants 65+ 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0 0.28 276
Privatization 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.14 86 0.53
Pure in-house 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0 0.28 190
Higher education, share of adult pop. 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.29 276
Privatization 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.29 86 7.94
Pure in-house 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.18 190
Left-of-center share in local council 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.13 0.09 0.83 276
Privatization 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.11 0.09 0.78 86 5.84
Pure in-house 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.13 0.22 0.83 190
Notes: Population density is deﬁned as the total population per square kilometer (km2). Education is deﬁned as the share of the total population with more than three years
of university studies. Immigrant shares are the share of immigrants aged 65 and above, relative to the whole population in that age group. Total cost (in millions) and annual
cost per resident (in 1000s) are measured at 1990 prices in Swedish kronor (SEK). The t-test is applied to the 2009 data.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics, nursing-home care, 2000–2009,a for all municipalities, for municipalities that partially privatize provision and for those with pure in-house produc-
tion. Source: the National Board for Health and Welfare (NBHW).
Variable/Year Mean Std.dev. Min Max # Obs |t-test|
1990 2000 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009 2009
Total cost for elderly care services (million SEK/year) 191.70 181.95 333.70 15.80 4596.99 282
Privatization 401.68 297.54 501.80 44.10 2453.67 90 4.05
Pure in-house 149.94 127.09 197.57 15.80 4596.99 186
Cost per nursing-home resident (SEK1000/year) 459.90 536.72 85.59 275.94 834.98 282
Privatization 460.27 528.75 74.29 350.86 767.30 90 1.18
Pure in-house 460.35 541.73 90.54 275.94 834.98 186
Nursing-home residents, share of elderly population 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.10 273
Privatization 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.09 86 1.35
Pure in-house 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.10 190
Share procured 0.13 0.26 0.25 0 1 86
a Except nursing-home of residents, for which the period is 1990–2009.
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Fig. 2 displays the average mortality rate for only those munici-
palities that, by 2009, had privatized the service. The solid (dashed)
line represents the municipalities before (after) they opened to
private provision. As mentioned, one municipality had already
done so in 1990. All municipalities in our sample that eventually
opened up the market during the period of study had done so by
2008; hence the line representing as yet pre-reform municipali-
ties disappears after 2007. Visual inspection of the graphs suggests
that privatization is associated with lower mortality rates, but
only for the more senior age group, not for the group of 60–69
year olds.
5. Empirical approach
We identify the effect of opening elderly care services to private
provision by comparing the municipality-wide changes in mortal-
ity following a shift to private provision, relative to contemporaneous
changes in mortality among municipalities that maintained pure
in-house provision.22 As noted, using municipality-wide mortality
rates avoids problems of selective referrals (or sorting), since fewer
than two out of 1000 nursing-home residents receive elderly care
outside of their home municipalities.
We use mortality as an objective and relevant measure of non-
contractible quality. It is widely used as a quality indicator formedical
and related services and it has the interesting property that it is ob-
servable to us, in the sense that it is amenable to econometric
analysis. Furthermore and as noted, we know from direct inspec-
tion of contracts that it was not contracted upon. A likely reason
is that it would be too noisy to use as a signal of quality at the
nursing-home level.
The identiﬁcation strategy uses shifts from pure in-house to
private provision. Given the long-run positive trends in health and
22 Sommers et al. (2012) use similar methods to assess the impact of expanded
Medicaid eligibility.
Fig. 1. Mortality rates for elderly in municipalities that have partially privatized provision and for other municipalities that did not (“pure in-house”). Left panel, 60–69
years of age, and right panel, 70 years and older.
Fig. 2. Mortality rate for elderly in municipalities that shifted from pure in-house provision to privatization, prior to privatization (solid line) and after (dashed line). Left
panel, 60–69 years of age, and right panel, 70 years and older.
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resultant falling mortality rates (see Figs. 1 and 2), a simple before-
and-after comparison will not yield an unbiased estimate of the
effect. By using the mortality rate in municipalities with only in-
house provision as a counterfactual for the mortality rate in the
absence of privatization, we could potentially take these positive
health trends into account in a difference-in-difference (DD)
framework.
However, the regime is a choice variable for the municipality.
The shift toward private provision could be due to a shock to the
municipality that also had an impact on our measure of quality, i.e.,
themortality rate. For example, a negative budget shock could trigger
a transition to private provision and spending cuts that could also
affect the health of the population in the municipality. This would
invalidate the strict exogeneity assumption needed in a standard
DD framework.
A further complication is that trends in mortality rates may differ
between reforming and non-reformingmunicipalities. Some authors
(e.g. Shkolnikov et al., 2012) have argued that the health status, and
hence longevity, of the population living in more privileged areas
has increased more than that of the population living in less priv-
ileged ones. Since the population in the municipalities shifting from
pure in-house to private provision has a higher average socio-
economic status, there is a relevant concern over diverging trends
for the two groups.23
In order to take these potential complications into account, we
use a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) framework. We
assume that the population below 70 years of age is not affected
by the change in nursing-home provision. Under this assumption,24
we can use those aged 60 to 69 to control for shocks and differ-
ences in trends that are correlated with the decision to procure.
We deﬁne the mortality rate Mimt as:
M
No of deceased
N
imt
imt
imt
=
. (1)
where i = 1,…,9 represents age group, with each group comprising
ﬁve years; m = 1,…,276 represents municipality; t = 1,…,20 corre-
sponds to the period 1990–2009; and where the population size,
Nimt , is measured at the end of year t.
The identifying assumption of our DDD framework is that in the
absence of an effect from the introduction of private provision, the
time pattern of the differences in mortality rates of those older than
69 against those younger than 70 for the municipalities that priva-
tized shouldmatch that of municipalities that did not. In other words,
the differences in differences should be zero in the absence of an
effect from privatization.25 While we cannot test this assumption
directly, we can get an idea of whether the assumption is valid by
comparing i) the difference in mortality rates between the group
younger than 70 and those older than 69 in the years prior to
the introduction of privatization with ii) a similar difference in
mortality rates for those that have not (yet) allowed private pro-
vision of elderly care services. The result from this exercise is seen
in the scatter plot displayed in Fig. 3.
There are two reasons for why this is a reasonable speciﬁca-
tion. From the age of 40 at least until the age of 90, the logarithm
of mortality in general rises more or less linearly with age. For
example, the annual mortality rate is approximately 1% at the age
of 63 (68) and approximately 10% at the age 84 (87) for Swedish
men (women).
From the scatter-plot smoother we can see that there are very
small differences between the two groups. The mortality rates of
the over 69 year olds are around 5.7 (5.4) percentage points higher
at the beginning of the period and 5.4 (5.2) percentage points higher
at the end of the period than they are for the younger age group
for municipalities with private provision (pure in-house produc-
tion). Given the small differences in levels, any functional-form
assumption in a regression model used in the estimation should not
be inﬂuential for the inferences.
We also cannot see any sharp difference in the year just before
opening to private provision, which supports the strict exogeneity
assumption. Fig. 4 provides a scatter-plot smoother for the differ-
ence between the two curves in Fig. 3, with the 95% conﬁdence
interval indicated. Importantly, we can see that by taking the dif-
ference, the decreasing trend in mortality is removed; the difference
in mortality rates is basically ﬂat. Overall, we conclude that the dif-
ference in levels is small and not statistically signiﬁcant.
5.1. Analysis
Let Pmt be a step function that takes value 0 until the time mu-
nicipality m shifts to privatization, and 1 afterward. Furthermore,
let Iimt =1 if the age group is above 69 years of age. The following
model forms the basis for our analysis:
Ln M P P I X uimt m t i mt mt imt mt imt( ) = + + + + + + +α α α α β β β0 0 1 2 , (2)
Here αm , αt and αi are municipal, calendar time and age group
ﬁxed effects, respectively, while uimt is the error term. The param-
eter of interest is β1 . The ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimator of
β1 will, under the assumption of strict exogeneity, be an unbiased
estimate of the effect of privatization.
23 If we use a DD model in the estimation, given diverging trends in mortality, the
estimates could be downward biased, i.e. we could ﬁnd a negative effect even though
there is no effect from the privatization. In a DD model with ﬁxed year effects we
would use the within-municipal variation in mortality (i.e. before–after). However,
the problem with this approach is that would not be able to control for the fact
that the timing of privatization is endogenous. If the timing were due to a budget
deﬁcit the DD estimate could be biased upward, i.e. the estimate could be positive
even though there is no effect from privatization.
24 Note that if the population below 70 is affected, but less so than older cohorts,
the analysis below provides a lower bound of the effect.
25 As explained in detail below we believe it is reasonable to assume a potential
effect on mortality to be proportional to the baseline for all age groups. This means
that the DDD model is speciﬁed in logs rather than levels. The maintained identi-
ﬁcation assumption is then that improvements in mortality in the old elderly are
proportional to, rather than equal to, improvements in mortality in the young elderly.
We have, however, estimatedmodels both in logs and levels and the results are robust
to model speciﬁcation.
Fig. 3. Themean difference in mortality rates between those older than 69 and those
younger than 70, for the municipalities that have partially privatized provision at
time 0 and for those that did not (yet) reform. The lines are estimated using LOESS
with one degree of freedom.
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Note also that the shift, Pmt , takes place at different time periods
and not, as in traditional DD and DDD models, at the same time
period for all of the treated groups. The primary advantage is that
the inference from our model is less susceptible to common shocks,
which may plague the traditional DD and DDD models (Bertrand
et al., 2004).
Our speciﬁcation implies equal proportional effects on the mor-
tality rate for all age groups affected by privatization. There are
two reasons for why this is a reasonable speciﬁcation. From the
age of 40 at least until the age of 90, the logarithm of mortality in
general rises more or less linearly with age. For example, the annual
mortality rate is approximately 1% at the age of 63 (68) and ap-
proximately 10% at the age 84 (87) for Swedish men (women).26 For
this reason we prefer a logarithmic model in the estimation of the
effect of privatization.27 The second reason is that the share of each
age group that lives in nursing homes is highly correlated (ρ > 0.99)
with the per-age-group average mortality rate.
We include in Xmt the population density, the share of the pop-
ulation with more than three years of university studies, the share
of immigrants aged over 64 and, ﬁnally, the share of the seats on
the local council held by left-of-center parties. The inclusion of socio-
economic factors is motivated by, for example, Gallo et al. (2000)
and Shkolnikov et al. (2012). The former ﬁnd that the job-market
situation has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on physical andmental
health, after controlling for other socio-economic factors, while
Shkolnikov et al. (2012) ﬁnd evidence of increased differences in
mortality rates between population groups with different levels of
education. The job-market situation is not included in our model,
however, because it is only available from 1993 onward. Also, ed-
ucation and employment are highly correlated (0.45) and education
and average income are also highly correlated (0.89). The correla-
tion between average employment and average income is 0.61.
Themain advantagewith themodel speciﬁcation (2) is that, given
the graphs displayed in Figs. 2 and 3, it is transparent with respect
to the identiﬁcation strategy. In order to test the model speciﬁca-
tion we estimate a model in which – in addition to the three main
ﬁxed effects – we also control for all three second-order interac-
tions. This speciﬁcation allows for more ﬂexible control of potential
differences-in-difference in trends across municipalities with pure
in-house production and those that open to private provision. To
this end, we specify and estimate the following model:
Ln M P I uimt t i p pt it ip mt imt imt( ) = + + + + + + + +α α α α α α α β0 1 (3)
Here sub index p = 1 if a municipality ever privatized and p = 0
otherwise, where α α αp pt it, , , and α ip are privatizing-municipality,
privatizing-municipality-by-time, age-by-time and age-by-
privatizing-municipality ﬁxed effects, respectively. Note that this
speciﬁcation is a complement to the speciﬁcation in (2). In (3) the
focus is on “non-parametric” control for differences over time
between municipalities with pure in-house production and those
that, at some point, privatize. Unfortunately data here do not allow
for themunicipal ﬁxed effects and time varyingmunicipal covariates
that we used to control for potential difference in trends across
municipalities in (2).
6. Results
In this section, we ﬁrst present results for mortality (DDDmodel)
and then for costs (DD model).
6.1. Mortality
Expressions (2) and (3) specify the models used in the estima-
tion of the effects of privatization on mortality over the period 1990
to 2009.28 Estimation of models (2) and (3) is performed with
weighted least squares (WLS). The (square root of the) population
size is the natural weight as each individual living in Sweden should
have the sameweight. An analysis without weights would give more
weight to individuals living in smaller municipalities. Inference is
performed with standard errors that are estimated under the as-
sumption of within-municipality level correlations (i.e. within-
municipality clustered standard errors).
The results from the estimation of model (2) with different sets
of controls are displayed in Table 3. In column (1) we only control
for age. Column (2) gives the result when we add municipal ﬁxed
effects and in column (3) we additionally control for calendar
time. Column (4) provides the results from the full model given in
Equation (2).
From column (1) of this table we can see that when we do
not control for the municipality, the estimate is small and statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. The results from the speciﬁcations in columns
26 SCB, see: www.scb.se/statistik/_publikationer/BE0701_1986I03_BR_BE51ST0404
.pdf.
27 As a sensitivity analysis we also estimated models with mortality rates in levels;
as expected given the graphs displayed in Fig. 2, the results are robust to this change
in speciﬁcation.
28 Due to lack of data on the employment rate for the ﬁrst three years, a shorter
panel is used when municipal control variables are included.
Fig. 4. Themean difference in mortality rates between those older than 69 and those
younger than 70 for the municipalities that have partially privatized provision at
time 0 against the corresponding mean difference of those that did not (yet) reform.
The lines are estimated using LOESS with one degree of freedom.
Table 3
Estimation results of effects of privatization on (log) mortality (DDD).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimate −0.006 −0.013** −0.016*** −0.016***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age-group ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Control variables Yes
Notes: Estimation of the model displayed in equation (2) is performed with weighted
least squares (WLS) using the size of the population as weights. Standard errors, dis-
played within parentheses, are estimated by clustering at the municipality level.
Control variables are the population density, education, the employment rate, and
the share of immigrants aged 65 and above.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
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(2)–(4), however, are all statistically signiﬁcant and of the samemag-
nitude. The point estimates with and without control variables are
virtually the same and suggest that allowing private providers to
compete for contracts would reduce the mortality rate by 1.7%. That
the effect is similar with and without control variables suggests that
selection based on unobservables should not be a problem in our
analysis (cf. Altonji et al., 2005).
As a sensitivity analysis we have also estimated model (3), which
provides us with more ﬂexible control for potential differences in
mortality trends between municipalities that are related to socio-
economic factors. The results are displayed in Table 4. In addition
to the ﬁxed effects, we have successively added second-order in-
teraction terms. In column (1) we have added age-by-year effects,
column (2) includes age-by-privatization ﬁxed effects and, ﬁnally,
column (3) presents the results from the fully speciﬁed model (3).
The results are once again very stable and also very close to the
results displayed in Table 3. The results from the preferred model
(column 3) suggest that the introduction of private provision would
reduce the mortality rate by 1.6%.
We have found that the opening of elderly care services to private
provision results in a reduction of the mortality rate by about 1.6%
in the affected population. The question, then, is how this effect
should be interpreted. In the relevant age groups, only around one
person out of nine lives in a nursing home, and the average spell
in a nursing home is around two years. Under the simplifying as-
sumption of no time dependence, this means a yearly death hazard
of 50%. Then, under the assumption that all of the effect stems from
increased health among those living in nursing homes, we get a re-
duction in hazard rates from 50% to 48.3%. This means that a reform
that introduces private provision and competition increases lon-
gevity from 2 to around 1/0.483, corresponding to an average increase
in longevity of around 4 weeks.
6.2. Costs
We have also estimated the effect of the reform on the costs for
municipalities. As explained in the data section, this variable is only
available from 2000.We treat the costs per person living in an elderly
home as the dependent variable. The primary reason for using this
variable instead of the total cost is that the observed change in quality
from privatization affects the demand for elderly care services, which
in itself has a direct effect on total cost (more weeks in elderly care).
As a sensitivity analysis, however, we also estimated the effect on
total cost. In this analysis the unit of interest is the municipality and
we therefore estimate the effects on the (log) cost using the mu-
nicipal ﬁxed-effect ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator. In this
analysis we cannot control for shocks causingmunicipalities to priva-
tize or not, which the DDD design allowed for. Instead a DD design
is used. The results on cost should therefore be seen as comple-
menting the above analysis onmortality by only providing suggestive
evidence of effects on cost.
The results from the estimation are displayed in Table 5. From
this table we can clearly see that when we control for calendar-
time ﬁxed effects, the effect of competition decreases the cost per
resident. This result is stable when we add control variables to the
regressions.
In Table 6 the corresponding results in which we regress the shift
on log total cost are displayed. From this table we can see an initial
increase in total cost, but this effect disappears when controls are
added.
6.3. Summing up
Taking the effect on mortality also into account, our results in-
dicate that opening of nursing-home care for the elderly to
competitive private provision – at least to some extent – increases
quality, while at the same time decreasing the cost per resident. The
shift has no effect on the total cost of elderly care services. The effect
on the per-person total cost is most likely outweighed by a rela-
tive increase in time spent living in nursing homes.
7. Discussion and conclusions
Somewhat contrary to our expectations, we ﬁnd evidence
suggesting that non-contractible quality – as measured by (inverse)
mortality rates – increases with a shift to private, competitive pro-
vision. We arrive at our results after controlling for municipality
characteristics, year effects and socio-economic factors using a
difference-in-difference-in-difference approach. This means that we
can control for differences in levels between municipalities, for
common time trends, and also for municipal-speciﬁc trends – to
the extent that different age groups in relative terms follow the same
trends within a municipality. Furthermore, since our study is based
Table 4
Estimation results of the effects of privatization on (log) mortality (DDD).
(1) (2) (3)
Estimate −0.023*** −0.015*** −0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Age, municipal, time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Age-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Age-by-privatization municipality
ﬁxed effects
Yes Yes
Privatization-by-year ﬁxed effects Yes
Notes: Estimation is performed with weighted least squares (WLS) using the size
of the population as weights. Standard errors are displayed within parentheses. They
are estimated by clustering at the municipality level.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
Table 5
Results from the regression of privatization on (log) cost per resident living in nursing
homes (DD).
(1) (2) (3)
Estimate 0.105** −0.019* −0.017*
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Municipal ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Control variables Yes
Notes: Estimation is performed with OLS. Standard errors are displayed within pa-
renthesis. Control variables are share of seats held by left-wing parties in the local
council, share of population with more than three years of university education and
share of immigrants among the population aged 65 or more.
* p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
Table 6
Results from the regression of privatization on (log) total cost (DD).
(1) (2) (3)
Estimate 0.018 0.014 −0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Municipal ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Calendar-time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Control variables Yes
Note: Estimation is performed with OLS. Standard errors are displayed within pa-
rentheses. Control variables are share of seats held by left-wing parties in the local
council, share of population with more than three years of university education and
share of immigrants among the population aged 65 or more.
* < p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
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on municipal-level data, we avoid bias due to selection effects at
the nursing-home level.
Municipalities that begin to privatize elderly-care services ex-
perience a reduction in mortality rates and these improvements are
concentrated in the age groups where nursing-home residency is
common. Per-capita costs did not go up, so we can conclude that,
in Sweden, the privatization of elderly care services has increased
a form of non-contractible quality (reduced mortality rates) while
simultaneously reducing costs per resident. A simple explanation
for these results, consistent with Hart et al. (1997), is that, even in
this industry, eﬃciency gains dominated cost-cutting incentives
when production was partially transferred to private suppliers. A
non-exclusive explanation is that it was the increase in competi-
tion associated with privatization that improved quality of service,
for example by triggering improvements in management prac-
tices and the ousting of under-performing managers.
As mentioned earlier, during most of the study period the public
procurement rules were rather liberal in Sweden, in the sense that
the buyer had a relatively high degree of discretion in the selec-
tion of contractors. This may also have allowed buyers to maintain
quality through informal reputational threats (“the shadow of the
future”).29 The fact that procured elderly care expanded rapidly during
this period may have further boosted the importance of future sales
relative to current proﬁtability. It will be interesting to see if our
result holds up in a few years, under the EU’s revised and stricter
rules aimed at limiting discretion and encouraging cross-border
entry, and when the market has left the ﬁrst expansionary phase.
Appendix: Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.010.
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